Thomas Frank’s new book The Wrecking Crew is in some ways a companion to his previous book, 2004’s What’s the Matter with Kansas? That book showed how American conservatives came to power by using the “culture wars,” which, Frank argued, are really a class war with the economics taken out. This new book, by contrast, details the next step: what those conservatives do once they get into power. Similarly, Kansas focused to a great extent on blue-collar activists, while The Wrecking Crew is about members of a different class: affluent, and moved almost solely by the wonders of the market. If Kansas gave us a portrait of working-class people betrayed, then The Wrecking Crew shows us the betrayers.
In his survey of this conservative managerial class, Frank focuses mostly on behind-the-scenes players. The primary drivers of Frank’s account of movement conservatism, and of conservative Washington, are not elected officials so much as people like Grover Norquist, Paul Weyrich, Richard Viguerie, and Jack Abramoff. Accountable to nobody, dedicated to the overwhelming goals of smashing the liberal state and defunding the American left, backroom players like these, Frank shows, are at the center of conservative misgovernance.
The Wrecking Crew is, however, more than a simple j’accuse; it is an anatomy of several momentous, generation-long transformations. Frank shows the transformation of much of the D.C. area from a middle-tier, middle-class city into one of the country’s most expensive urban areas. There is also the transformation of the College Republicans from a social club for the children of wealth into a radical cadre of activists-for-hire. There is the transformation of conservatism itself from an attitude of the complacent rich into an angry ideology of revolution. Most tellingly, there is the simultaneous transformation of conservatism from a set of political ideas into an organized, well-funded industry. All of these transformations are elements in an overall metamorphosis: the changing of the liberal democratic state into the conservative corporate state.
All of these transformations, Frank argues, have focused on only one thing consistently over time: the dismantling of democratic government and its replacement by market rule. Other conservative causes and justifications have come and gone over the years: anti-communism, the defense of apartheid South Africa, right-wing “freedom fighters,” all have slipped away as surely as the “global war on terror” will. What consistently remains is an attitude about government and the market: the former is always irredeemably bad and corrupt; the latter is always immaculately good and pure.
This attitude has profound effects on the way conservatives govern. Simply put, they govern badly because they believe that they must and should. As one conservative pioneer puts it, “the best public servant is the worst one.” The cronyism and ineptitude we have seen under the Bush administration, Frank argues, is not an accident. The appointment of people like Michael Brown to FEMA, the purging of competent staff at Justice and the EPA, the outsourcing of government responsibilities to the private sector, all of these are the results of this central conservative idea: that government is always evil, tyrannical, and corrupt anyway, and should therefore be made as ineffective as possible so that the wise, benevolent market can take over its functions.
People often describe the Bush administration’s failures as incompetence, but that presumes that the administration wants to govern effectively but doesn’t know how. In fact, Frank argues, there is a much better way of describing the conservative style of governance: “The correct term for the disasters that have disabled the liberal state is vandalism, conducted by a movement that refuses to play by liberalism’s rules” (Frank, 266). Under conservatism, bungling is simply the order of the day.
Overall, the story that Frank tells is a grim one, and his narrative does not leave much room for hope. That is because, despite media mythology to the contrary, liberalism and conservatism are in no way mirror images of each other; they are entirely different creatures:Liberalism, as we know it, arose out of a long-ago compromise between left-wing social movements and business interests. It depends utterly on the efficient functioning of certain organs of the state, and it does not call for some kind of all-out war on private industry. Conservatism, on the other hand, speaks not of compromise but of removing its adversaries from the field altogether…. [C]onservatives freely and openly fantasize about doing away with those bits of “big government” that serve liberal ends. And while defunding the left is the north star of the conservative project, no comparable campaign to “defund the right” exists; indeed, it would be difficult to imagine one (Frank, 266-267).
This institutional New Deal liberalism, this “compromise between left-wing social movements and business interests” will, Frank argues, continue to be attacked for some time because, while the business interests still exist, the original “left-wing social movements” are largely moribund or dead, leaving behind only their undefended structural legacy. Movement conservatism, on the other hand, is organized, wealthy, uncompromising, and vital.
Frank leaves his readers with a paradox and a challenge. The paradox is that, despite the conservatives’ rhetorical longing for the old days of the white picket fence and the prosperous small town, it is their own movement that has destroyed that world – a world that the New Deal liberalism they abhor built in the first place. The challenge is to find a way to make people realize this fact: that conservatives have had their chance; that we have seen what they do when in power; that they are responsible for what has happened to us. “Whenever there was a choice,” Frank writes, “to be made between markets and free people – between money and the common good – the conservatives chose money. It’s time to make them answer for it” (Frank 274). This book, in providing such a comprehensive account and analysis of conservative misgovernance, is a good first step in that direction.
In his survey of this conservative managerial class, Frank focuses mostly on behind-the-scenes players. The primary drivers of Frank’s account of movement conservatism, and of conservative Washington, are not elected officials so much as people like Grover Norquist, Paul Weyrich, Richard Viguerie, and Jack Abramoff. Accountable to nobody, dedicated to the overwhelming goals of smashing the liberal state and defunding the American left, backroom players like these, Frank shows, are at the center of conservative misgovernance.
The Wrecking Crew is, however, more than a simple j’accuse; it is an anatomy of several momentous, generation-long transformations. Frank shows the transformation of much of the D.C. area from a middle-tier, middle-class city into one of the country’s most expensive urban areas. There is also the transformation of the College Republicans from a social club for the children of wealth into a radical cadre of activists-for-hire. There is the transformation of conservatism itself from an attitude of the complacent rich into an angry ideology of revolution. Most tellingly, there is the simultaneous transformation of conservatism from a set of political ideas into an organized, well-funded industry. All of these transformations are elements in an overall metamorphosis: the changing of the liberal democratic state into the conservative corporate state.
All of these transformations, Frank argues, have focused on only one thing consistently over time: the dismantling of democratic government and its replacement by market rule. Other conservative causes and justifications have come and gone over the years: anti-communism, the defense of apartheid South Africa, right-wing “freedom fighters,” all have slipped away as surely as the “global war on terror” will. What consistently remains is an attitude about government and the market: the former is always irredeemably bad and corrupt; the latter is always immaculately good and pure.
This attitude has profound effects on the way conservatives govern. Simply put, they govern badly because they believe that they must and should. As one conservative pioneer puts it, “the best public servant is the worst one.” The cronyism and ineptitude we have seen under the Bush administration, Frank argues, is not an accident. The appointment of people like Michael Brown to FEMA, the purging of competent staff at Justice and the EPA, the outsourcing of government responsibilities to the private sector, all of these are the results of this central conservative idea: that government is always evil, tyrannical, and corrupt anyway, and should therefore be made as ineffective as possible so that the wise, benevolent market can take over its functions.
People often describe the Bush administration’s failures as incompetence, but that presumes that the administration wants to govern effectively but doesn’t know how. In fact, Frank argues, there is a much better way of describing the conservative style of governance: “The correct term for the disasters that have disabled the liberal state is vandalism, conducted by a movement that refuses to play by liberalism’s rules” (Frank, 266). Under conservatism, bungling is simply the order of the day.
Overall, the story that Frank tells is a grim one, and his narrative does not leave much room for hope. That is because, despite media mythology to the contrary, liberalism and conservatism are in no way mirror images of each other; they are entirely different creatures:
Liberalism, as we know it, arose out of a long-ago compromise between left-wing social movements and business interests. It depends utterly on the efficient functioning of certain organs of the state, and it does not call for some kind of all-out war on private industry. Conservatism, on the other hand, speaks not of compromise but of removing its adversaries from the field altogether…. [C]onservatives freely and openly fantasize about doing away with those bits of “big government” that serve liberal ends. And while defunding the left is the north star of the conservative project, no comparable campaign to “defund the right” exists; indeed, it would be difficult to imagine one (Frank, 266-267).This institutional New Deal liberalism, this “compromise between left-wing social movements and business interests” will, Frank argues, continue to be attacked for some time because, while the business interests still exist, the original “left-wing social movements” are largely moribund or dead, leaving behind only their undefended structural legacy. Movement conservatism, on the other hand, is organized, wealthy, uncompromising, and vital.
Frank leaves his readers with a paradox and a challenge. The paradox is that, despite the conservatives’ rhetorical longing for the old days of the white picket fence and the prosperous small town, it is their own movement that has destroyed that world – a world that the New Deal liberalism they abhor built in the first place. The challenge is to find a way to make people realize this fact: that conservatives have had their chance; that we have seen what they do when in power; that they are responsible for what has happened to us. “Whenever there was a choice,” Frank writes, “to be made between markets and free people – between money and the common good – the conservatives chose money. It’s time to make them answer for it” (Frank 274). This book, in providing such a comprehensive account and analysis of conservative misgovernance, is a good first step in that direction.
